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<title>CaveBear Blog</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog/</link>
<description><![CDATA[Thoughts and Commentary by Karl Auerbach<br>
<i>Locus ab auctoritate est infirmissimus</i>&nbsp; ("The argument from authority is the weakest.") -- Thomas Aquinas]]></description>
<dc:language>en-us</dc:language>
<dc:creator></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2010-04-20T01:02:17-08:00</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000343.html">
<title>Hackin&apos; the SEC&apos;s Regulations</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000343.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I see in the news that the SEC has picked up an idea I proposed way, way, way back in the 1970's when I was in law school, which was to express legal constructs using something resembling a programming language.</p>
<p>Now, back then I merely wanted the ability to write contracts using a structured language things like if-then-else clauses and subroutines with parameters - a kind of glorified templating language.</p>
<p><A href="http://jrvarma.wordpress.com/2010/04/16/the-sec-and-the-python/">The SEC apparently has gone further and is considering expressing the dynamics of financial matters using the Python language in regulations.</A></p>
<p>That reminds me of something I came across a very long time ago:&nbsp; Early Unix had a blackjack program.&nbsp;
It could be beaten 100% of the time by the simple technique of betting negative dollars and playing to lose.</p>
<p>Which is to say that unless the SEC is willing to engage in the very dark and arcane voodoo of program correctness, and
even if it does, the SEC is going to find its regulations being hacked much as we hacked the blackjack game.</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Law, Society, and Policy</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2010-04-20T01:02:17-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000342.html">
<title>What&apos;s Wrong With The FCC&apos;s Consumer Broadband Test?</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000342.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The FCC recently <A href="http://www.broadband.gov/">published some tools</A> to let consumers measure some
internet characteristics.</p>
<p>The context is the FCC's "National Broadband Plan".&nbsp; I guess the FCC wants to gather
data about the kind of internet users receive today so that the National Broadband Plan, whatever it
may turn out to be, actually improves on the status quo.</p>
<p>The motivation is nice but the FCC's methodology is technically weak.</p>
<p>There are several goals to which the National Broadband Plan ought to aspire:</p>
<ul>
<li>That consumers have a subjective sense that their use of the internet is fast and without
unacceptable delays.&nbsp; I picked a subjective standard here for reasons to be discussed later
in this note.</li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;">That reliability of consumer access is high and that the time for providers to detect, diagnose,
and repair problems is low (and not expensive to providers.)&nbsp; It seems that these matters
of reliability are routinely ignored, yet they are of paramount concern, particularly as the internet
becomes more and more a part our health and safety systems; it will be a sorry day if someone picks
up their internet based VoIP phone to call 911 and the link (or some necessary ancillary service, such as DNS)
is down for an extended repair.</li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;">That consumers' have a real foundation to believe that their use of the net is private and not
being used either to generate marketing data about them.</li>
</ul>
<p>This note will address only the first of these goals.</p>
<p>The first thing that is wrong is that the FCC's tools are not well focused with regard to exactly
what parts of the internet they are measuring.&nbsp;
And second, the measurements that are taken are too vague to be of more than anecdotal value.</p>
<p>I've drawn up a simple diagram to illustrate.</p>
<IMG src="http://www.cavebear.com/images/stories/misc/fcc-internet.png" width="640" height="360" hspace="12px" vspace="0" border="2" style="padding:12px;">
<p>This is a simplified diagram, it is intended to focus on that part of the net of concern to the
National Broadband Plan.&nbsp; In particular it looks at the part of the net that represents
the "internet" product sold by today's Internet Service Providers (ISPs).&nbsp;
The arrows in this drawing are interfaces where these clouds join, they are not communications lines.</p>
<p>This diagram shows things as connected clouds because that more accurately represents the things
that make up the way that user's connect to the internet.&nbsp;
The basic parts of the diagram are these:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>User Network</strong>: Many users today, and probably nearly all users in the future, will have networks,
often wireless, within their homes.&nbsp;
The quality and traffic of those networks will have a substantial effect on consumer's perceptions of net quality (and ISPs
will bear increasing non-reimbursed costs when their customers have troubles in his part of the net.)&nbsp;
However, except with regard to the maintenance issue, the user's home network cloud ought to be considered neither
as part of either the National Broadband Plan or of the FCC's Consumer Broadband Test.</li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;"><strong>User Access Link</strong> and <strong>User's ISP Cloud</strong>:
I have shown the provider ISP's path as two parts.&nbsp;
First is the part that runs from the router of "modem" at the consumers
home or office to the provider's first IP router.&nbsp;
The second part is the provider's internal "backhaul", i.e. the IP network inside
the provider.&nbsp; It is important to consider these two parts separately.
<ul>
<li style="margin-top:1em;"><strong>User Access Link</strong>: This is the part of that today's ISPs advertise
to consumers; this is the part about which the claims of umpteen megabits/second download are made.&nbsp;
In general the User Access Link is the IP "hop" between the user's home modem or router and the first IP router
within the ISP.&nbsp;
Often this "link" is composed of several communications technologies.&nbsp; For example what appears to the consumer
to be an Asymmetrical DSL link (ADSL) might be composed in full or in part of ATM or other non-IP switching technologies
that exhibit many of the congestive and impairment behaviors found in IP networks.&nbsp;
There may be MPLS paths that simply do not show up in "traceroute".&nbsp;
Moreover, the User Access Link may have an IP Maximum Transmission Unit size that is less than the 1500 bytes
that is presumed by a considerable amount of end-user network applications and protocol stacks; that difference
can have a substantial negative impact on some forms of network traffic (video) and almost none on others (VoIP).&nbsp;
The User Access Link should not be considered as a private path that is not shared with other users' traffic.</li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;"><strong>User's ISP Cloud</strong>: This is that portion of the ISP that carries
traffic to and from customers User Access Links.&nbsp;
Some resources that are critical to user perception of network speed may be located here, most particularly
domain name system (DNS) resolvers, web caches, email servers, and the like.&nbsp;
For small ISPs the "ISP Cloud" might be as simple as a small Ethernet at the provider's facility; for
larger ISPs the "ISP Cloud" might be an national or international network of substantial size and power.</li>
</ul></li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;"><strong>Internet</strong>: This is the vast landscape of the internet except for those content
providers with which the ISP entered into special traffic exchange arrangements.</li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;"><strong>Private Peering to large content providers</strong>: This is often where the largest of the
large network traffic sources and sinks are to be found.&nbsp; This is the land of Google/YouTube and of
content distribution networks.&nbsp;
Content to/from users might be able to flow via the internet to those places but in order to provide
faster access and to give the large content providers better control over the quality of their
products both ISPs and large providers often prefer to create these kinds of special peering
relationships.&nbsp;
This is a game for big players; small ISPs and smaller content providers are often not able to play at these tables.<br><br>
(Please note that I am using the word "peering" in a way that may be different from its use in
settlement-free peering between ISPs.)</li>
</ul>
<p>The portions of interest to the FCC's National Broadband Plan are the part between "A" and "B" and between
"A" and "C".&nbsp;
These are shown inside the yellow box.</p>
<p>So what does all of this have to do with the National Broadband Plan in general and the FCC's Consumer
Broadband test in particular?</p>
<p>First of all, we must recognize that a user's perception of network quality and speed is a complex function
that involves the <strong>entire</strong> path between the user and the remote service.</p>
<p>Many protocol stacks and applications can degrade badly even if one seemingly small aspect changes.&nbsp;
For example, the speed with which domain name system (DNS) queries are answered is often a major, or even the
dominant, component of how quickly web pages are fetched and rendered.&nbsp; Indeed with the increasing number
of "analytics" web bugs and links to "share" content the number of DNS queries involved in a page fetch can be
quite surprising.&nbsp; 
And DNS responsivity is a matter that involves more than mere bandwidth.</p>
<p>Other applications degrade for other reasons.&nbsp;
VoIP is often made incomprehensible by even small amounts of packet reordering, something that can occur
quite often as a result of certain wireless technologies, load-balanced pathways, or routing behavior.&nbsp;
And applications that use large packets, applications such as high quality video, can be badly affected
by fragmentation of packets due to link MTU values of less than about 1500 bytes.</p>
<p>There are many characteristics that play a part.&nbsp;
Among these are Quality of Service (QoS) handling,
queuing disciplines and drop policies in routers, and
congestion handling in protocol stacks.&nbsp;
Moreover there are an increasing number of protocol "accelerators" that try to obtain
better user performance by abandoning the protocol etiquette algorithms that are built into
well implemented TCP stacks.&nbsp; Those accelerators may create local benefits to their users,
as long as the number of such users is small, but they damage the experience of other users.</p>
<p>The National Broadband Plan tends to be involved only with the "User Access Link" part of my drawing.&nbsp;
Yet the FCC's tests tend to lump all the parts of the drawing into one number thus masking the contribution
of each part.</p>
<p>A national broadband build-out that does not deal with the entire system will be a waste of
time and money.&nbsp; A user whose ISP has a magnificent broadband User Access Link
but inadequate backhaul and connectivity to
the internet at large is a user who is going to be dissatisfied.</p>
<p>Thus for the FCC's tests to be meaningful they need to do two things:</p>
<ul>
<li style="margin-top:1em;">They need to isolate and separately report the attributes of the User Network,
the User Access Link, the User's ISP Cloud, and the degree of private peering to large content providers.</li>
<li style="margin-top:1em;">The attributes that are measured need to be much deeper than "bandwidth" and
"latency" and "jitter".&nbsp;
I would recommend that the FCC look at the way that tools like <A href="http://www.caida.org/tools/utilities/others/pathchar/">PathChar</A> and <A href="http://www.kitchenlab.org/www/bmah/Software/pchar/">Pchar</A> construct a detailed
hop-by-hop analysis of network paths.&nbsp;
Those tools require many thousands of packets over many tens of minutes for each hop in a path.&nbsp;
In my own work I began (but never completed) a project to design a protocol to enable the fast and
inexpensive measure of paths characteristics for proposed packet flows.&nbsp; That work is
visible on the net at <A href="http://www.cavebear.com/archive/fpcp/fpcp-sept-19-2000.html">http://www.cavebear.com/archive/fpcp/fpcp-sept-19-2000.html</A>.
</li>
</ul>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Internet Technology</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2010-03-15T02:51:38-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000341.html">
<title>Network Neutrality, UPS, and FedEx</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000341.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I buy a lot of things that are delivered by UPS or FedEx.&nbsp;
And I kinda like to watch the progress of the shipments.</p>
<p>Now we all know that UPS and FedEx have different grades of service - Overnight, Two Day, Three Day, etc.&nbsp;
And faster deliver costs more.</p>
<p>Several years ago UPS and FedEx would frequently deliver a Two Day package the next day, i.e. they would effectively
elevate the class of service.&nbsp; A lot of us took advantage of that by sending almost everything using the
lesser grade (and price) and often winning a higher grade (and price) delivery.</p>
<p>I am sure that that that did not please the bean counters at the shipping companies.</p>
<p>Today, with better tracking systems UPS and FedEx almost never deliver a package in advance of the delivery
time for the paid class of service.&nbsp; They will hold packages in their warehouses in order
to make this so.&nbsp; Today, if you want a given class of service you can get it only by paying for it; the
old gambling trick no longer works.&nbsp; I am sure that this has increased UPS' and FedEx' revenue.</p>
<p>The thing to note here is that UPS and FedEx <strong>can</strong> carry packages Overnight, but that they
impose a delay, often an artificial delay, on packages that aren't paying the premium Overnight tariff.</p>
<p>So what has this got to do with Network Neutrality?</p>
<p>Consider an ISP that adopts the UPS/FedEx model.&nbsp; In particular let's say that this ISP
decides to impose a delay of 100 milliseconds on all standard class packets and does so in a way that is
completly neutral as to source, destination, or protocol.&nbsp; On a 10gigabit link that means holding about 125megabytes
of traffic, in each direction, in a delay queue - that's a number readily within the range of today's technology.</p>
<p>Then that ISP could offer premium, i.e. more expensive, grades of service that bypass some or all of that 100 millisecond delay.</p>
<p>I have never heard anyone claim that either UPS or FedEx is not acting with neutrality.&nbsp;
It would seem that an ISP that acts as I have described would also be able to claim that it is just as
neutral as UPS and FedEx.</p>
<p>I did not pick 100 milliseconds out of the air - rather I picked it because it can have a pernicious effect on
VoIP.  The ITU publishes 150ms as the time limit beyond which the users of a VoIP call to go into
"walkie-talkie" mode.&nbsp;  100ms, one way, does not reach that amount, but it is close enough that other network
delays could easily push the connection over the edge; and round trip time will certainly exceed the threshold.&nbsp;
In other words, a completely neutral application of 100ms to all packets, VoIP or not, will force VoIP users to upgrade to
a premium service.</p>
<p>Other network activities would be impaired.&nbsp; Domain name transactions would slow down causing user perceptions
of sloggish service.</p>
<p>Bulk data transfers, such as web downloads of images, would only be marginally effected once TCP adapts to
the round trip time.&nbsp; But ISP's could "fix" that by adding some packet loss and some delay jitter
to their "standard" quality.</p>
<p>The point of this exercise is to suggest that ISPs have a well stocked bag of tricks to induce users to
pay more for what we used to get for free from "best effort" services on the internet.</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Law, Society, and Policy</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-12-24T02:07:17-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000340.html">
<title>Internet Epitaphs</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000340.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Some ideas for epitaphs for the internet era:</p>
<ul>
<li>Her FIN has been ACKed.</li>
<li>He's now a higher level abstraction.</li>
<li>She has moved up the protocol stack.</li>
<li>He is now a perfect packet traversing a loop free path of celestial ASN's.</li>
<li>She has gone to the ultimate peering point.</li>
<li>Her TTL went to zero.</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Apropos of Nothing</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-12-10T01:49:42-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000339.html">
<title>The ACPA and the Rule Against Digital Perpetuities</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000339.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The copyright-forever crowd is once again trying to turn copyright into a card that
trumps civil liberties, due process, and Constitutional limitations.</p>
<p>The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that is being
<A href="http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/2955/125/">"secretly" negotiated</A> by the US and
other nations would require signatory nations to impose a regime similar to the US DMCA,
including Digital "Rights" Management (DRM) anti-cirumvention.</p>
<p>Under the United States Constitution
<A href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_Clause">(Article I, Section 8, Clause 8)</A>
the United States can only create copyright rights if
those rights are constrained to exist only for "limited times".</p>
<p>DRM lasts forever.</p>
<p>DRM will make it difficult, often impossible, to make use of materials once the
copyright term expires and the material enters the public domain.</p>
<p>DRM creates a perpetual right to prevent copying - a perpetual copyright.</p>
<p>And DRM will make it difficult, often impossible, for historians and archivists
of the future to examine materials even long past the expiration of any copyright.</p>
<p>It thus of great importance that the ACTA adopt what I call "The Rule Against Digital Perpetuities":</p>
<blockquote>
  <p><em>No Digital Rights Management (DRM) limitation or anti-copying mechanism may endure longer than the
  copyright in the protected work.</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p style="margin-top:12px;">See my prior notes on this subject:</p>
<ul>
<li><A href="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000113.html">The Rule Against Digital Perpetuities</A></li>
<li><A href="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000272.html">The Rule Against Digital Perpetuities - A Reprise</A></li>
</ul>
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Law, Society, and Policy</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-12-05T17:08:19-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000338.html">
<title><![CDATA[Questioning Authority &ndash; Searching For Stability In Internet Governance]]></title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000338.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Here is the text of my talk today (November 13, 2009) at
the LTA Symposium at the
the Center for Law, Technology, and the Arts at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law in
Cleveland, Ohio.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Questioning Authority &ndash; Searching For
Stability In Internet Governance</h2>
<h3>Pre-talk &ndash; Who I am (one slide)</h3>
<P>Hello, I am Karl Auerbach.</P>
<P>I've been around the internet for a very long
time.</P>
<P>If there is anything about the net that is
constant it is that the net is always changing.</P>
<h3>Introduction</h3>
<P>A few months ago we discovered a hidden plumbing
problem in my house.  We hired a building inspector to take a look at
the damage.</P>
<P>He told us that the supporting structure was badly
damaged, that it was at risk of collapse, and that we'd have to
replace some large supporting timbers.</P>
<P>Today much of our discussion has been about the
more refined aspects of trademarks and domain names.</P>
<P>In this talk I'm going to take you in a different
direction, down into the basement to take a look at the quality of
the timbers that hold up trademarks, domain names, and internet
governance.</P>
<h3>Governance, Authority, and Technical Reality</h3>
<P>Let's begin with the conflict between governance,
authority, and technical reality.</P>
<P>The fabled anarchy of the internet is rapidly
becoming a thing of the past.</P>
<P>Bodies and rules internet governance are quickly
becoming a framework around which we structure our internet
businesses and our internet lives.</P>
<P>If that framework lacks a firm foundation it could
warp, be manipulated, or collapse.</P>
<P>Such a collapse would, in turn, have a ripple
effect on all of the relationships and rights that we have
constructed on that framework.</P>
<P>The effects of a crack in the foundation of
internet governance could be significant, far flung, and painful.</P>
<P>---</P>
<P>When it comes to governance of the internet there
are two foundation-stones: authority and technical reality.</P>
<P>Without authority, internet governance loses its
power to command.  Without authority a body of internet governance
becomes nothing more than a small stone that barely disturbs the
river flowing around it.</P>
<P>And without technical reality a body of internet
governance will find itself superseded and become irrelevant.</P>
<P>We as a community of lawyers and technologists
have been surprisingly willing to assume that authority exists or
that technology will not someday be used in ways different than is
the current norm.</P>
<P>The point of this talk is that we need to step
back and examine our assumptions.</P>
<P>It is my contention that we will find the
foundations of internet governance are lacking, weak, and in conflict
with technical reality.</P>
<P>I believe that is time to put out the cautionary
yellow flag in the race for  internet governance.</P>
<P>We need to take a time-out to establish a firm
foundation of legitimacy, authority, and technical relevance.</P>
<h3>ICANN</h3>
<P>Our focus here is Domain Names and Online
Trademarks &ndash; which puts us squarely in the bailiwick of ICANN.</P>
<P>A considerable portion of the rights that people
believe they have in domain names and in trademarks associated with
domain names derives from ICANN's provisions embedded in ICANN
contracts.</P>
<P>Without ICANN many of our perceived rights in
domain names and trademarks could vanish.</P>
<P>---</P>
<P>ICANN's foundation reminds me of a friend who
lives in New Hampshire in a house built in 1763. 
</P>
<P>In the process of exploring a drainage problem he
discovered that the house had been built on nothing more substantial
than a few stones that had been piled up to support the wooden sills
upon which the house was framed.</P>
<P>It cost a small fortune to jack the house up,
insert a real foundation, and then cure the warping that had
accumulated over the years.</P>
<P>I'm afraid that ICANN has put us into a similar
position.</P>
<P>ICANN  hits the double jackpot. 
</P>
<P>ICANN lacks a source of authority.  And ICANN is
based on a technical fantasy.</P>
<P>Unless these are cured we may have to jack-up our
existing rules of domain names and trademarks, build a new
foundation, and deal with the accumulated warpage.</P>
<P>To make matters worse the method of control used
by ICANN will amplify the extent of the damage should ICANN begin to
wobble.</P>
<P>ICANN sits at the vertex of a pyramid of
contracts.</P>
<P>That guarantees that uncertainties about ICANN
will quickly propagate.</P>
<P>ICANN's lack of authority means that it may be
vulnerable on the grounds that it is an unlawful combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade.</P>
<P>We are here in Cleveland, home to J.D. Rockefeller
and the Standard Oil Company.</P>
<P>J.D.R justified his monopolistic practices on the
grounds they  eliminated the harmful effects of competition.  That
certainly sounds like the arguments that INTA has advanced its
arguments against new top level domains.</P>
<P>ICANN may eventually have to face the same
questions that were faced  in the 19<SUP>th</SUP> century by the
Standard Oil Company.</P>
<P>And ICANN might have to answer those questions not
only in the US but also in non-US jurisdictions such as the European
Union.</P>
<P>--</P>
<P>ICANN's lack of <I>technical</I> reality means
that ICANN will find itself high-and-dry should someone chose to
establish a new DNS root.</P>
<P>--</P>
<P>These cracks in the stability and clarity of
ICANN's role in internet governance will become wider and deeper as
ICANN attempts to splatter itself into multiple legal entities in
multiple countries using specialized national legal structures.</P>
<P>---</P>
<P>So let's examine the foundations that underlie our
existing ICANN based regime of trademarks and domain names.</P>
<h3>Where Is ICANN's Source of Authority?</h3>
<P>Where is ICANN's source of authority?</P>
<P>Many believe that ICANN's source of authority is
like the Seven Cities of Cibola &ndash;  illusory.</P>
<P>Does ICANN's glamor of authority exist only
because internet users have, for the moment, chosen to avoid asking
the hard question?</P>
<P>ICANN began and remains merely a California
corporation.  ICANN has no special legal status.</P>
<P>The authority that ICANN wields must come from
some external source.</P>
<P>Did ICANN's authority come from the US Government?</P>
<P>ICANN's governmental companion, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, has never been
able to articulate a clear statement of its own authority to act as a
regulator of domain names nor that if it had such power that it has
the power to delegate it to a private corporation.</P>
<P>No less an authority than the US Congress' GAO has
looked at ICANN &ndash; twice - and has come away without being able
to find that either the Department of Commerce or NTIA has adequate
authority.</P>
<P>Not long ago, in September of this year, ICANN and
NTIA signed an &ldquo;Affirmation&rdquo; that purports to reduce the
degree to which ICANN can be viewed as an instrumentality of the
United States government.</P>
<P>That agreement was notable for the absence of any
statement that could be construed as a delegation of authority to
ICANN.</P>
<P>Alternatively was ICANN's authority somehow
derived from Jon Postel or the function that Jon filled, that of the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)?</P>
<P>If so, how did that task, a task performed via the
University of Southern California, leap to ICANN</P>
<P>Assuming that Jon or IANA had the powers that
ICANN now wields, an assumption that is not particularly solidly
grounded, there is neither a trail of documents nor an oral history
to support an argument that a transfer did occur.</P>
<P>Where else might we look for the source of ICANN's
authority?</P>
<P>NTIA did issue a zero dollar purchase order under
which ICANN performs an undefined &ldquo;IANA function&rdquo;.</P>
<P>It is hard to reconcile a government purchase
order, the same process that the government uses to purchase
janitorial services, as amounting to a delegation by the US
government of discretionary authority over a large part of the
internet.</P>
<P>Did that purchase order delegate to ICANN a right
to charge internet users what cumulates to a large amount of money
for the privilege of using certain parts of the net?</P>
<P>Did that PO give ICANN the power to assign very
lucrative parts of the net to third party operators for time periods
that are effectively perpetual?</P>
<P>---</P>
<P>If ICANN's authority did somehow come from the US
Government, then what happens to that delegation as ICANN and the US
Government try to distance themselves from one another?</P>
<P>---</P>
<P>These are not situations that create a sense of
stability.  Rather it suggests that ICANN has been nailed together
too quickly.</P>
<P>We've all seen Road Runner cartoons.</P>
<P>Is ICANN in a situation like that of Wylie Coyote
when he has run off a cliff and is standing in mid air?  We all know
what comes next - he looks down, realizes his predicament, and then
crashes to ground.</P>
<h3>ICANN Versus Technical Reality</h3>
<P>It was once believed that the seas were too vast
to be controlled.</P>
<P>And it has been said that the internet must have
exactly one domain name system.</P>
<P>The idea that the seas were too vast was
demolished in the latter 1800's by Captain Alfred Mahan of the United
States Navy.</P>
<P>Is ICANN about to crash on the reef of technical
reality?</P>
<P>---</P>
<P>ICANN's control over DNS depends upon the belief
that the internet must have exactly one domain name system and that
whoever controls the top level text file called &ldquo;the root zone&rdquo;
controls that DNS.</P>
<P>That belief is technically inaccurate.</P>
<P>There already exist competing domain name systems.
</P>
<P>Most of them are run very poorly and have given a
bad name to the concept.</P>
<P>But good operators, needing only an investment of
a few hundred thousand dollars, easily and without needing any
permission can establish competing roots.</P>
<P>And despite the common wisdom, and the
self-preserving statements of ICANN, the existence of competing roots
no more destabilizes the internet or causes user confusion than the
existence of competing mobile telephone companies.</P>
<P>There are significant impulses that are inducing
the creation of competing roots.</P>
<P>First is the profit motive &ndash; there are
considerable opportunities to derive positive cash flow from a well
run competing root.</P>
<P>Second is that it provides a market-driven answer
to the Gordian knot of new top level domains.</P>
<P>Third is that ICANN is perceived, even after the
recent &ldquo;Affirmation&rdquo; as an instrument of United States
hegemony over the net, thus suggesting to other nations the
possibility of establishing their own roots as a kind of internet
declaration of independence.</P>
<P>Should competing roots arise, ICANN will lose its
ability to dictate the terms of the domain name marketplace,
including the UDRP, Whois, and new TLDs.</P>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<P>In conclusion there are several reasons to be
concerned that the foundation underpinning ICANN and today's domain
name word is brittle and could suffer catastrophic collapse through a
successful lawsuit or the establishment of competing DNS roots.</P>
<P>This does not mean that we should panic.</P>
<P>The absence of clear authority can be remedied
through national legislation and international treaty.</P>
<P>Competing DNS roots can be viewed not as a threat
but as an opportunity to allow market-driven deployment of new top
level domains.</P>
<P>In the longer term today's domain name wars may
become nothing more than sound and fury signifying nothing.</P>
<P>All of this may become moot because technical
innovation, particularly with the rise of better search and directory
systems, is eroding domain names as indicators of sources of goods
and services.</P>
<P>In other words, the idea that domain names are
trademarks may be an idea that has as much place in the future
internet as a dial-up modem.</P>
<P>--</P>
<P>I'll be happy to take questions.</P>
<P>Thank you.</P>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Law, Society, and Policy</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-11-13T21:54:36-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000337.html">
<title>Thunderbird 3.0b2 is Awful</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000337.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>It's been over a year since my prior blog entry.&nbsp; I've been busy.</p>
<p>So I'll start off with something indisputable - the latest version of the
Thunderbird email tool (version 3.0b2) is really awful.</p>
<p>This new version of Thunderbird locks up, seems to spend an inordinate
amount of time loading and reloading mailboxes, becomes non-responsive to
clicks, can't delete mail, and sometimes even refuses to close.</p>
<p>This new Thunderbird is a big step backwords.</p>
<p>It makes me pine for my favorite email tool, pine/alpine.</p>
<p><em>Update, Aug 23, 2009:</em>Thunderbird 3.0b3 is just about as bad.&nbsp;
It continues burn enormous amounts of CPU time, it continues to become
non responsive to user input, and it posts far too many gratuitous  messages
that it is to busy doing something else.&nbsp; The authors should be ashamed
at how badly they have bungled a once useful tool.</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Technical Information</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-07-06T15:10:08-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000336.html">
<title>Second Annual National Institute: CyberLaw: Expanding the Horizons</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000336.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This looks like an <A href="http://www.abanet.org/cle/programs/n08ceh1.pdf">interesting conference program</A>.&nbsp;
Last year's conference was quite good.&nbsp; I'd be there this year
except that I'll be on my way to the ICANN meeting in Paris.</p>

<p>The panel on "The Future of ICANN and Control of the Web" looks
rather intriguing and, given the panelists, might cause a few
sparks to fly.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Law, Society, and Policy</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-01T17:33:53-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000335.html">
<title>Serendipitous Data Collection</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000335.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In 1969 the Firesign Theatre recorded
"How Can You Be in Two Places at Once When You're Not Anywhere at All"</p>

<p>People who diagnose and repair networks have long experienced the
truth of that title - no matter where you happen to be, the test data you need to
know can only be acquired by being somewhere else.</p>

<p>In my own experience at Wells Fargo in the 1980's I more than once
had to run back and forth through the streets of the San Francisco
financial district, often at 3am, to check circuits and devices
on a malfunctioning network path.</p>

<p>Telco people long ago learned to incorporate "remote loopback" and
remote testing capabilities into their devices.&nbsp;
Internet people have not been as smart.</p>

<p>Today's state of the art of network troubleshooting is a
individual practitioner, a person who has deep knowledge and experience with
the net from the bottom to the top, who carries his/her own ad hoc
toolkit of favored hardware widgets and software packages, and who is
tired of being called at 3am to fix some routine network outage.</p>

<p>Today's net is filled with sorry excuses for equipment that can't
recover from routine outages.&nbsp; How many home ADSL modems lock up
every few days or whever the telco drops the phone circuit for a few
moments?&nbsp; The usual repair is the old-fashioned, brute force, but quite
effective power cycling of the unit.&nbsp;
Why are not these devices designed so that they recycle themselves
when they fail to perceive a flow of IP packets for an extended period of time?&nbsp;
A little self-introspection and self-recovery could go a long way.</p>

<p>I've long been on the quest to build the Internet Buttset.&nbsp;
My 1993 product Dr. Watson, The Network Detective's Assistant (DTWNDA)
was a first step.&nbsp; (The sad story of why that product disappeared
is something for another day.)</p>

<p>It strikes me that one thing that could be incorporated into internet devices,
particularly devices used for testing and diagnostics,
is something that I call "Serendipitous Data Collection".</p>

<p>The basic idea is quite simple -
When a device needs a chunk of data, that
device publishes a request in a well known directory.&nbsp;
Other devices periodically look at the published requests.&nbsp;
If one of those other devices happens to be in,
or later happens to travel to, a part of the net where the requested
data can be obtained that other device collects the data and holds it.&nbsp;
That other device, if it comes near the directory,
deposits that data into the directory.&nbsp;
The original device may (or may not) subsequently notice the published data,
pick it up, and use it.</p>

<p>The words "directory" tend to imply something more glorified than is
really necessary.&nbsp; Consider handheld network testing devices that live
in a charging/docking unit when not in use and that, when in use, are carried
by network operations staff to various parts of an Enterprise network.&nbsp;
The charging/docking station then becomes the interface to a simple
repository of requests and answers.</p>

<p>It is a simple bulletin-board model.&nbsp; Security is not strong -
which is why I tend to think of this in the context of network testing
and diagnostic devices.</p>
<p>Network diagnostic and repair tools must often be exempt from
the constraints of network security.&nbsp;
This means that many of these tools would have to designed only
to engage in intrusive or risky operations only when used by
by people who are both trustworthy and skilled.</p>

<p>A surgeon's scalpel must be very sharp.&nbsp;
A surgeon's scalpel can cause a lot of harm if misused.&nbsp;
Network troubleshooting and repair require invasive tools
that are able to cut into the network to reveal the inner workings.&nbsp;
These tools could cause a lot of harm if misused.&nbsp;
None of us would want a surgeon to operate with a dull scalpel;
we accept that the value outweighs the risks.&nbsp;
Similarly, we should not want the internet to be denied good
repair tools just because those tools, if misued, could cause harm.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Internet Technology</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27T01:00:45-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000334.html">
<title>Bea Yormark</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000334.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I think it was Athol Fugard who wrote that the saddest words
are "too late".</p>

<p>I saw in the newspaper that Bea Yormark has died.&nbsp; Too soon.</p>

<p>I first met Bea back in 1981 at Interactive Systems in Santa Monica.&nbsp;
I remember her Mercedes - dark blue paint and light blue smoke.&nbsp;
And I remember one evening at softball when she was pitching;
I hit a hard line drive that barely missed her - it brushed her ear ring.</p>

<p>I remained in contact with Bea after she moved to Washington DC
with my Gaithersburg based co-worker at Interactive,
Justin Walker, Curmudgeon at Large.</p>

<p>Not long afterwords I had my own romantic adventure; I became involved
with a woman who lived in DC.&nbsp;
It was a very complicated and very stressful time.&nbsp;
But it was a time made much easier with the caring friendship offered
by Bea and Justin.</p>

<p>I later moved to San Francisco&nbsp;
A while later Bea and Justin also came west to Palo Alto.&nbsp;
Even though we were only an hour drive apart, we did not remain in
contact.</p>

<p>I've always intended to resume the contact.&nbsp; But always I was too busy.</p>

<p>But now she is gone.&nbsp; It is too late.</p>

<p>We've lost a good person.</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Life</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27T00:58:42-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000333.html">
<title>Comcast - Euphemism City</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000333.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I am tired of Comcast continuing to claim that is merely slowing network traffic.</p>

<p>When Comcast sends a TCP Reset packet the TCP connection instantly dies.&nbsp;
TCP Resets are internet ricin.</p>

<p>The BitTorrent application uses several TCP connections, so it is somewhat robust against
Comcast's TCP-murderous rampages.&nbsp;
But most other applications are not - a TCP Reset stops those applications dead in
their tracks.</p>

<p>The sending of forged TCP Reset packets has as much to do with "network management" as
shooting a bullet into the head of a hyper-active child has to do with "day care".</p>

<p>Is Comcast simply being too cheap to install in-band equipment that would do the the right thing,
the thing consistent with the internet architecture: dropping packets while congestion
is occurring and thus allowing the TCP connection to remain alive, albeit with reduced
data flow?&nbsp; One such right way is called <A href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_early_detection">Random Early Detection - RED</A>.</p>

<p>Comcast's behavior suggests that has installed much less expensive out-of-band equipment
that can only shoot deadly TCP Reset packets.&nbsp;
In other words it may well be that cause of Comcast's problems is
that Comcast is too cheap to "do it right".</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Internet Technology</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-21T16:03:47-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000332.html">
<title>My comments to NTIA&apos;s &quot;mid-term review&quot; of its ICANN &quot;JPA&quot; agreement.</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000332.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[My <a href="http://www.cavebear.com/archive/public/ntia-jpa-2008.html">comments to NTIA</a> on "The Continued Transition of the Technical Coordination and Management of the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System: Midterm Review of the Joint Project Agreement" are now online at <a href="http://www.cavebear.com/archive/public/ntia-jpa-2008.html">http://www.cavebear.com/archive/public/ntia-jpa-2008.html</a>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Internet Governance</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-06T17:43:08-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000331.html">
<title>What would the internet be like had there been no ICANN?</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000331.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Suppose that back in 1997 the US Department of Commerce,
via its National Telecommunications and Administration
Administration (NTIA) had not adopted, without any demonstrable source
of legal
authority, that hangnail from the Reagan-Thatcher
school of government - the idea that governmental powers are best
exercised by private actors without the nuisances of public
constraint and public oversight.</p>
<p>There is a branch of fiction known as "Alternative History".
These are stories of what might have been.&nbsp; What might have
been had
the British intervened on the side of the South in 1863? What might
have happened had Khrushchev not backed down in Cuba in 1963? What
might have happened had the Supreme Court not stepped into (onto?)
the Florida presidential vote count in 2000?</p>
<p>In that vein I am about to engage in a bit of alternative
history.</p>
<p>I am going to speculate about how the last ten years of
internet
history might have been had the US government, rather than
deciding to renew the Network Solutions contract, had, instead,
opted to drop its marionette strings and allow the forces of
competition, innovation, and consumer choice to operate as we
expect them to operate in an open, unregulated, competitive
economy.&nbsp; In other words, what if the US government had not
created
ICANN?</p>
<p>Being an untrained and clumsy writer, I'm going to be blunt
about foreshadowing the tale: Without an ICANN we would today have
greater innovation in the internet name space.&nbsp; Domain name
prices
would be lower, consumer choice would be greater, and the internet
would have greater resilience to failures than it has today.</p>
<p>The road we did not take would have been the better choice.</p>
<p>Is the dead hand of the past so strong that we are forced to
live forever with that mistaken choice and never seek
correction?</p>
<p>Shakespeare wrote, "[w]hereof what's past is prologue, what to
come in yours and my discharge." Is the future really in our hands?
Can we treat the choices of 1997 as mere prologue to a story not
yet written?</p>
<p>Before starting, let us detour a bit and review the events
that
led to the ICANN of today.</p>
<p>There were two intertwined stories:</p>
<p>First was the story of the Cooperative Agreement with Network
Solutions (a company that was subsequently acquired by Verisign and
then, shrunk to a mere registrar, and sold off, with Verisign
retaining the registry role.)</p>
<p>Second was the story of Jon Postel's test of the internet's
domain name system.</p>
<p>Let's look at these stories:</p>
<h4>The Story Of The Cooperative Agreement</h4>
<p>The increasingly lucrative cooperative agreement under which
Network Solutions (Verisign) was managing .com, .net, .org, and
.edu was scheduled to expire in 1998.&nbsp; Under that agreement
Network
Solutions was obligated to deliver back to NTIA the tools and data
necessary to transfer operations to another contractor or to the
public.</p>
<p>In 1997 the US government agencies became concerned - some
might
say they began to panic.&nbsp; They felt compelled to chose between
three
ill alternatives:</p>
<ul>
  <li>Extending the Network Solutions contract.</li>
  <li>Replacing Network Solutions as a contractor much as the US
National Park Service occasionally replaces the concessionaires it
uses to run the government owned hotels at the Grand Canyon,
Yellowstone, and Yosemite national parks.</li>
  <li>Relinquishing the government's role over the internet's
domain
name, IP address, and protocol parameters assignment systems.</li>
</ul>
<p>The government felt that the second of these three choices -
replacement of Network Solutions with another contractor - would
require a formal procurement process that could take several years.
Consequently this option was never seriously considered.&nbsp; One
could
wonder why the government did not consider combining the first and
second options - one term of extension in order to give time to
engage in a formal procurement.&nbsp; Whatever the answer, the fact
is
that replacement of Network Solutions was never seriously
pursued.</p>
<p>This left two options - extend or relinquish.</p>
<p>The government people chose what they believed was the lesser
of
two evils - they chose to extend the Network Solutions contract.
This choice was not unreasonable - the people who made the choice
are well-intentioned, smart, and informed; but the option to relinquish
would have
required that they convince many less informed people in the
executive and legislative branches of the US government that the
nascent internet would be better left to private enterprise and
choice.&nbsp; It seems that even those who hew to a "small
government is
a better government" point of view have a hard time letting go of
government control over the internet.&nbsp; And few civil servants
would
risk being branded as "the man who lost the internet".</p>
<p>So, rather than ending the Cooperative Agreement, a product of
a
much different internet era, NTIA decided to give it a face-lift.
In fact, the agreement has had its face lifted nearly a dozen
times.&nbsp; The
resulting miracle of bureaucratic plastic surgery remains in force
to this day, a lifespan increase of over 300% so far and with no
clear sign that it will ever end.&nbsp; This extension represents a
government backed gift to Network Solutions, and its successor,
Verisign, that by some estimates amounts to an income stream of
nearly half a billion dollars every year.</p>
<h4>The Story of John Postel's Test</h4>
<p>In early 1998 Jon Postel decided to do a very good thing.
&nbsp; Postel wanted to validate that the DNS was as robust as it
was purported
to be.&nbsp; Postel decided to run a limited test in the IP address
from
which root servers obtain their "zone files" would be
altered.&nbsp; This
was not a particularly radical test and, should things have gone
awry, backing out would be both fast and easy.&nbsp; Also remember,
this
was in years before internet had obtained massive public
visibility.&nbsp; What Postel did was quite in keeping with the
pragmatic
approach&nbsp;from which the internet grew - an approach in which
one tests, learns, and improves.&nbsp; Nonetheless, the government
went
ballistic.&nbsp; Postel was threatened with severe legal, even
criminal,
sanctions.&nbsp; Postel, an employee of USC-ISI asked his employer
for
help; USC-ISI refused.&nbsp; Postel felt what anyone would feel -
alone
and afraid.</p>
<p>So Jon Postel, a California resident, asked for
help.&nbsp; An
attorney from Washington DC showed up on his doorstep; an attorney
who does not seem to be able to demonstrate having a license to
practice law in California.&nbsp; But despite that apparent lack,
Postel
accepted this attorney.</p>
<p>This attorney was from the Washington DC office of the
Cleveland
Ohio firm of Jones Day.</p>
<h4>The Stories Intertwine</h4>
<p>In 1997 NTIA began to emit strong pheromones that it wanted
the
law firm of Jones Day to create a nominally private corporation to
assume the powers that NTIA was exercising, albeit without any
apparent source of legal authority for the exercise of those
powers.&nbsp; In other words, NTIA, an agency of the Executive
Branch,
wanted to induce the creation of a private body to do things that
NTIA wanted done but for which NTIA did not have the legal
authority to do itself.&nbsp; (The reader would not be alone if
this
suggests that NTIA uses ICANN in much the same way that the US
State Department uses Blackwater.)</p>
<p>Jones Day responded (much to the benefit of its balance sheet:
Jones Day's response has turned into a revenue stream that floods
ever larger with every passing year.&nbsp; As ICANN's largest
creditor,
Jones Day yearly reaps millions of dollars in legal fees from the
corporation that Jones Day created to serve NTIA.)</p>
<p>Postel's attorney from Jones Day started circulating drafts of
a
plan to form a body to be called ICANN.&nbsp; Each successive draft
seemed to be the result of yet another hidden agreement with yet
another round of unknown parties.&nbsp; Midway through this
sequence, Jon
Postel died.&nbsp; But his attorney survived.&nbsp; And further
iterations
appeared (as presumably more secret back room promises were
made.)</p>
<p>NTIA, in an effort to appear open to other plans did allow
other
plans to be submitted; but it was pretty clear from various
inchoate emanations that none of these had any hope and would have
no weight except, perhaps, to slightly nudge the Jones Day plan.
One of the most influential of these other plans was that of the
Boston Working Group, a group with which I am affiliated.&nbsp; Our
proposal is still visible on the net at
<a href="http://www.cavebear.com/bwg/">http://www.cavebear.com/bwg/</a>
As expected, the Jones Day plan won
NTIA's nod of approval.</p>
<p>The fruit of this NTIA-Jones Day cultivation was a strange
creation: ICANN, a thing neither fish nor fowl, not clearly
private
yet not clearly governmental, and like Prospero's Ariel able to
operate beyond the normal constraints that restrain governmental
agencies and the laws and economic forces that channel and limit
private action.</p>
<p>A small number of incumbent interests find ICANN to be highly
satisfactory
and lucrative.&nbsp; However, most of us end up with something
rather
less pleasant: Anyone buying a domain name now pays a private
internet tax to ICANN and domain name prices are massively inflated
(by perhaps 35,000%) with regard to the actual costs.&nbsp; Others
find
ICANN as a body that restrains trade by denying their completely
legal enterprises entre into the domain name marketplace or by
subjecting their businesses processes to a small mountain of
contractual gobbledygook.</p>
<p>NTIA and ICANN have effectively allowed the .com and .net top
level domains to become the private property of Verisign.&nbsp; It
is not
often that a caretaker, like Network Solutions, is allowed to
reward itself with ownership of the estate.&nbsp; By way of analogy
it is
as if the company that was hired to run the hotel at the Grand
Canyon has been allowed to become owner of the hotel and the Grand
Canyon.&nbsp; This is a rather bizarre twist, yet that is what has
happened.</p>
<p>The cost to the community of internet users is enormous -
Every
year more than half a billion dollars is paid by internet users in
the form of inflated and arbitrary domain name fees.&nbsp; And if
that
were not bad enough, internet innovation and imagination have been
smothered on the altar of registry profits and trademark
protectionism.</p>
<p>So much for the real history.</p>
<h3>The Alternative History</h3>
<p>Let us turn back the calendar to 1997.&nbsp; Let us posit
that NTIA
has decided to let the cooperative agreement expire and has
required Network Solutions (Verisign) to return the materials and
data that it is obligated to return under the terms of that
agreement.</p>
<p>And let us posit that NTIA has decided not to merely replace
one
face with another and instead has decided to open the door to
enterprise and innovation by providing that name registration data
to any and all comers.</p>
<p>And let us suppose that when Jon Postel ran his very sensible
test that the US government did not cluck itself into a Chicken
Little frenzy and demand that the net must be wrapped with a
Procrustean regulatory system.</p>
<p>At this point perhaps you are hearing a voice in your head
suggesting, or perhaps screaming, "there would have been chaos",
this is an unbelievable alternative history.</p>
<p>Is it really unbelievable?&nbsp; It certainly was
possible.&nbsp; What is
chaos to one is often opportunity to another.&nbsp; Is it not one
of the
foundation stones of our social system that individual choice is to
be preferred to both monopoly markets and government
regulation?</p>
<p>What is unbelievable to this writer is that the US Government
leapt to the conclusion that heavy regulation of the net was
required without ever really considering how the net might be
nudged, rather than bludgeoned, towards greater commercial
stability.</p>
<p>J.&nbsp; D.&nbsp; Rockefeller, one of the greatest
monopolists of all time,
justified his destruction of his competitors, his imposition of
rigid controls over the petroleum refining and transport
industries, and his nearly imperial control of distribution
channels and products on the grounds that he was merely
"rationalizing" and "standardizing" the oil business.</p>
<p>Those who argue in favor of ICANN often use Rockefeller's
argument - they justify ICANN's rigid regulation as a way to
rationalize the marketplace of internet names so that the
incumbents in that marketplace can be spared the discomfort of
competition and the buyers of domain names relieved of the burden
of having to make a choice between different offerings.</p>
<p>Do we want to "rationalize" the internet in same way that
Rockefeller "rationalized" the petroleum refining industry of the
1870's?</p>
<p>I think not.</p>
<p>But I digress; let us return to our story:</p>
<p>Suppose that in 1997 NTIA decides it will allow the
cooperative
agreement to lapse at the end of 1998 and that six months prior to
the expiration, and again at the time of expiration, NTIA will make
a copy of the operational data available without charge or
encumbrance.&nbsp; NTIA decides that 1998 would be a year of
transition.</p>
<p>NTIA's decision does not eliminate Network Solutions; it
merely
removes Network Solution's monopoly.&nbsp; If Network Solutions
chose to
do so, it could continue its operations.&nbsp; But it would no
longer be
alone or given any preference or special privilege.</p>
<p>In other words, NTIA decides that at the end of 1998, at the
end
of the agreement, anybody who wants to run .com, .net, .edu, and
.org would be free do so, using his/her own capital, using his/her
own business plan, and at his/her own risk.</p>
<p>Remember the movie Spartacus?&nbsp; The rebelling slave army is
captured and the Roman general asks "Who among you is Spartacus?"
One by one every slave stands up and says "I am Spartacus".</p>
<p>In our tale the ending of the cooperative agreement would
cause
a similar scene: New vendors, and Network Solutions - everyone -
would have stood up and said "I am .com", "I am .org", "I am
.net".</p>
<p>None would be and all would be.&nbsp; There would be no
legal ground
to distinguish among the claimants.&nbsp; The would have to compete
among
themselves.&nbsp; Network Solutions would, however, been the
Goliath.</p>
<p>How precisely this competition would have resolved itself none
can say.&nbsp; But we can say with certainty that it would have
quickly
resolved itself as it always does when there is a lot of money on
the table.</p>
<p>I suppose that those of you who are still with me will be
reminded of<br>
<a href="http://www.physics.uci.edu/%7Ejeff/grfx/miracle.gif">the
cartoon</a> in which some scientists have filled a blackboard
with equations.&nbsp; And in the middle of the board is a cloud
with the
words "Then a miracle occurs".</p>
<p>Am I suggesting that NTIA should have bet the internet of 1997
on a miracle? Yes, I am.</p>
<p>But it is no less betting on a miracle than we do every day
when
we allow electricity, food, fuel, and many other aspects of our
normal lives to be handled by the miracle of private innovation and
competition within the limits set by law.</p>
<p>Would there have been an uncomfortable bump? Yes, there
probably
would have been a period during 1997 when internet users wanting to
acquire domain names would not know clearly from whom to buy them.
Network Solutions, the former incumbent, would with almost
certainty obtain the lions' share of the business, not unlike the
way that the Baby Bells inherited most of the former Ma Bell
(AT&amp;T) customers when AT&amp;T was split apart.</p>
<p>What forms might have coalesced out of this temporary period
of
fog and uncertainty?</p>
<p>Competing root systems?&nbsp; Cooperative, truly non-profit,
registries?&nbsp; Co-op registries that operate by N of M consensus
systems?</p>
<p>All of these, probably.&nbsp; Not all would have
survived.&nbsp; Some would
have failed.</p>
<p>Some internet users would have had an experience similar to
that
of people who bought tickets on low fare airlines and charters
during the 1970: the carrier failed and they got stuck with a
worthless ticket and a claim in bankruptcy court on the remaining
assets of the bankrupt carrier.</p>
<p>In our alternative history some internet users will find that
they have acquired domain names that do not resolve.&nbsp; There
will be
lawsuits for fraud.&nbsp; Domain name providers who are smart will
quickly change their practices and contracts so that every domain
name buyer is made fully aware of the risks in much the same what
that buyers of securities in the US are provided with enough
information to make informed choices, should they chose to do
so.</p>
<p>January 1, 1999 would have dawned on a more stable
situation:</p>
<p>Network Solutions would be the dominant provider of domain
names
with a firm grip on the .com, .net, .org, and .edu top level
domains.&nbsp; Network Solutions would have simply bought out the
competition.</p>
<p>The suite of root server operators would
still
have been unaffected, no one would have yet seen the Google-like
opportunity that root and TLD servers provide.</p>
<p>However, and remember that this was during the height of the
.com bubble, money was available for just about anything.&nbsp; And
a lot
of people would have thought that having their own top level
domains would be profitable.&nbsp; (Even outside of our alternative
history, we can see from ICANN's actual year 2000 new-TLD process
that there was, in fact, a quite substantial interest in new
TLDs.)</p>
<p>These new TLDs would have soon discovered that they would not
even appear on the horizon of internet users until their TLDs were
incorporated into the root zone published by Network Solutions -
and Network Solutions would, understandably, not be quite willing
to give that kind of aide and comfort to their would-be
competitors.</p>
<p>By mid 1999 those who aspired to create new TLDs would have
recognized that Network Solutions was not going to allow them a
place in the sun and that the operators of the legacy root servers
weren't particularly interested in making changes.</p>
<p>So by September 1999 we would have seen the deployment of the
first competing root system run with as much capacity and
competence as the legacy roots.&nbsp; However, given the venture
funding
behind the new TLDs, these new root operators would have had access
capital for expansion and would have been created with the attitude
to aggressively reach for opportunities.</p>
<p>One of those opportunities would be what we today know as the
Google Model - selling marketing and advertising opportunities
while creating a positive feedback loop to increase those
opportunities by giving users a share of the proceeds.</p>
<p>In year 2000 the You-Root corporation, a privately owned,
for-profit, root
consortium, comes into operation in competition with the legacy
root.</p>
<p>You-Root has a multi-faceted business plan:</p>
<ul>
  <li>You-Root mines the DNS queries that arrive at its servers
to
generate a real-time feed of usage data that it sells to market
research firms, corporate marketing groups, and national
intelligence agencies.</li>
  <li>It drives traffic to its DNS servers by paying ISP's to aim
their DNS resolvers at You-Root.&nbsp; ISP's receive a monthly
check from
You-Root that is based on the number of queries that the ISP sends
to You-Root.&nbsp; (You-Root finds, however, that it must quickly
design
mechanisms to detect synthetic traffic that is sent for no reason
except to drive up the query counts.)</li>
  <li>You-Root sells space in its root zone file to aspiring
TLDs,
much as brick-and-mortar stores sell high visibility (such as
end-of-aisle) shelf space.</li>
  <li>You-Root includes all of the TLDs, along with the
information
to their name servers, into its root zone file so that users who
are switched from the legacy root are not surprised with name
resolution failures.</li>
  <li>You-Root uses "anycast" routing to
deploy name servers where the traffic concentration warrents (or
where customers are willing to pay for a local root server.)
You-Root also maintains a high degree of internet connectivity so
that its servers are perceived as highly responsive.</li>
  <li>You-Root will, for a fee, elevate a TLD's zone data so that
it
is serviced by one of You-Root's own root servers and thus save a
DNS query round trip time, thus making web pages under that TLD
appear more responsive.&nbsp; You-Root allows these TLDs to offer a
pass
through service in which the TLD's name registrants can also have their
zone
data elevated into You-Root's servers, thus saving even more DNS
query round trip times and making those registrants' web sites
appear even more responsive.</li>
</ul>
<p>You-Root gains market share as several ISP's, attracted to the
idea of payments for sending DNS queries to You-Root, re-aim their
servers.&nbsp; And large websites seeking to improve user
perceptions of
performance push to have their DNS zone data elevated into
You-Root's servers.</p>
<p>You-Root cuts a deal with Microsoft in which, for exchange for
real-time data for use in MSN, Microsoft will ship Windows with
You-Root as the default root server group rather than the legacy
root servers.&nbsp; A similar deal is made with Apple.&nbsp; In
neither deal is
it disclosed to the public in which direction any money payments
were made.</p>
<p>Now other aspiring root operators want to get into the game.
They follow You-Root's business model.</p>
<p>Soon the relationship between root server operators and TLDs
begins to shift - those TLDs that are more successful at gaining
registrants find that they become "must haves" and that they can
get root server operators to pay them for inclusion rather than
vice versa.</p>
<p>And all the while the Network Solutions/NTIA root zone becomes
less and less popular because it has become like a cable TV system
that only carries the ABC, CBS, and NBC television networks and
does not carry new content like CNN, Comedy Central, or HBO.</p>
<p>By the latter part of 2001 several root systems are in full
fledged competition, each trying to be carry more TLDs than its
counterparts.&nbsp; The result of this competition being that every
root
system carries all available TLDs except those few that are
stigmatized, as for example might happen if there is a trademark
dispute over who has the right to use a given name as a TLD.</p>
<p>As the pornography industry expands communities of users
realize
that one way they can protect themselves is by asking root
providers to offer tailored views of the DNS name space.&nbsp;
You-Root
and others begin to offer "family friendly" collections of TLD -
they will, for example, include the .Disney top level domain but
not .Sleeze.</p>
<p>Root providers will also offer TLD packages tailored for
various
religious, political, and social groups who, for whatever reason,
want to build walls between themselves and those who are not part
of their communities.</p>
<p>Some TLD operators will amplify this customer push for
differentiation by by using contracts with their registrants as a
means include or exclude certain types of content on websites found
under their TLDs.</p>
<p>TLD operators begin to start looking for more ways to
differentiate their offerings:</p>
<ul>
  <li>Some start offering name registrations
for short periods for use with one time events.</li>
  <li>Some sell names for very long periods for those who want to
latch onto an internet name for as long as the TLD remains.</li>
  <li>Some will sell via resellers (registrars), some will sell
direct.</li>
  <li>Some will give names away in order to increase the traffic
they
get and thus increase the value of the marketing data that they can
derive.&nbsp; (Most of these go the way of the Cue Cat and
disappear.)</li>
  <li>Some start selling names using digital certificates to
represent ownership, thus providing a means for both permanent and
anonymous registrations.&nbsp; Revenue will be obtained by charging
for
specific services (such as updating name server records) rather
than yearly domain name rent.&nbsp; This will induce the creation
of
independent exchanges in which domain names can be bought and sold,
often anonymously.</li>
</ul>
<p>Eventually root zone files will begin to bulge as every large
corporation decides that it wants its name to be a TLD.&nbsp; This
will
present technical challenges to root server operators to
disseminate updates to root zone files.&nbsp; (However, as we know
from
real-life .com, this is a problem that is manageable, at least up
to the present size of .com - over 70,000,000 names as of the date
of this writing, January 2008.)</p>
<p>Competition among TLDs and root providers drives prices down
and
down and down.</p>
<p>By 2007 typical price to a consumer for a domain name falls to
less than $0.25 per year, reflecting the actual mass scale of
economies that obtain in DNS, particularly when there is no
regulatory body imposing fiat registry rates an imposing its own
tithe on name transactions in order to fund itself.</p>
<p>DNS resiliency is improved: In 1997 DNS was a single point of
failure and attack for the internet.&nbsp; By 2007 there is a
multiplicity of competing roots that provide deep redundancy
against failure from natural or human causes.</p>
<p>DNS responsivity is improved - TLD operators recognizing that
DNS query/response time is a significant component of the user
perception of web site responsivity begin to push data and servers
closer to users.</p>
<p>New TLDs are no longer an issue - those who want to deploy a
new
TLD can do so.&nbsp; But as with nearly every other kind of product
offering, those who do this will have to expend time and effort to
build their TLD visibility and do so with their own money (or that
of their venture backers) at risk.&nbsp; Consumers of domain names
will
grow more aware of the risks of buying a name in these new
TLDs.</p>
<p>Some TLDs will never grow beyond boutique offerings that are
found in only a few root zones.&nbsp; Most of these will
fade.&nbsp; Others
will grow so that they become visible in nearly all root zones.</p>
<p>In the end we will have a marketplace that allows new TLDs to
be
born, to grow, to spread, and to die without any central regulatory
apparatus.</p>
<p>It will be a marketplace much like that found in the world of
cable TV, in which TLDs are similar to new TV channels.&nbsp; In
the
cable TV industry new channels must find a way to be included in
the offerings of the cable and satellite providers.&nbsp; In some
cases
these new channels will obtain visibility and become viable, in
other cases they will never obtain adequate acceptance and will
either disappear or be merged into another.&nbsp; In the DNS
industry,
new TLDs must find a way to be included in the offerings of root
providers else they will not gain sufficient visibility and use to
survive.</p>
<p>And so ends our alternative history - a history in which we
reach a stable, reliable DNS, both technically and economically,
but without the heavy hand and cost of regulation.</p>
<p>Is this alternative now impossible or could we turn away from
the regulatory system that has been imposed onto the internet by
the US Department of Commerce via ICANN?</p>
<p>There are many people who think that DNS must be regulated and
ossified into a single "authoritative" root.</p>
<p>There were many people who once thought the same thing about
the
voice telephone network. &nbsp;History proved them wrong.</p>
<p>And to finish on a final note that is neither hypothetical nor
an alternative history:</p>
<p>One of the things that neither ICANN, nor governments, nor
many
users are not realizing is that someday enough people might wake
up, question the dogma of the single "authoritative" catholic root.
They, just like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, already have the power
to overturn the status quo.&nbsp; Users of the net can simply, and
without the
need to ask permission from anyone or coordination with anyone,
turn the technical knobs on their DNS software and make the entire
legal, regulatory, and governance edifice fall to the ground -
while the net keeps on running without missing a beat.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Internet Governance</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-01-28T00:29:10-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000330.html">
<title>Bad Day</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000330.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday I was in LA at the ICANN meeting.&nbsp; It was Halloween;
a day in which symbols of death are everywhere and considered amusing.</p>

<p>Normally I would have stayed, participated, and written about what happened.</p>

<p>But, instead, last night I had to race home.&nbsp;
This morning my wife and I had to make an excruciating choice.&nbsp;
And, as a result, this afternoon a friend died.</p>

<p>My friend is cat, Moliere.&nbsp; He was almost 11 years old and
came down suddenly with renal failure.&nbsp; We had to decide
whether he would live (a short while) or die.</p>

<p>I held and comforted him as the injection was administered.</p>

<p>I felt him die.</p>

<p>He is dead; I am in shock.</p>

<p>At least it was fast - only a few seconds - and it seemed to be painless,
rather in contrast to the reported effects of the method used on humans.</p>

<p>Yes, he is a cat, "only" a cat, merely a cat, not a person.&nbsp;
I can only imagine
the greater pain of those who have to face such decisions about human
friends and loved ones.</p>

<p>So tonight Moliere lies buried between two trees on a small rise
above Carbonera Creek in the woods where he so much loved to hunt
and be a cat.</p>

<p>He lies buried with a copy of <A href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossing_the_Bar">Tennyson's Crossing the Bar</A>.</p>

<p>We miss him.</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Life</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-01T21:25:31-08:00</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000329.html">
<title>ICANN - New TLD Policy - The Anti-Innovation Act of 2007</title>
<link>http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000329.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I'm sitting in ICANN's new TLD policy session - the restraint
of trade is enough to gag a Rockefeller.</p>

<p>ICANN continues to espouse an internet that exists only in
its own image.&nbsp; An internet in which innovation and enterprise
are forced to conform to ICANN standards of goodness.</p>

<p>In other words ICANN is attempting to impose onto the internet
a set of constraints that would deny to new innovators the creative
rights - in Jonathan Zittrain's words, the generative rights - that
gave rise to the internet in the first place.</p>

<p>For example, ICANN's outgoing chairman made it quite clear that he
believes that top level domain used for political purposes would be
highly suspect.</p>

<p>ICANN continues to require that an applicant's finances and business
plans must undergo ICANN investigation and approval.</p>

<p>ICANN continues to require that names be sold through ICANN
accredited registrars - a requirement that makes utterly no sense except
as a protectionist measure to maintain ICANN hegemony and ICANN revenue -
not unlike the way that certain states require alcoholic beverages to
be sold through state-run stores.&nbsp;
It is a requirement that has absolutely nothing to do with the stability
of the internet.</p>

<p>Right now I'm listening to ICANN's policy to replace the legal system
with its own policy to decide who on the internet has the superior right to use
a name as a TLD.&nbsp; ICANN is creating law; yet ICANN is not a legislature.</p>

<p>Moreover ICANN's policy creates a veto power for organized interests, particularly trademark interests, to throw so much chaff into the air that
no new TLDs will ever survive the gauntlet.</p>

<p>What is particularly galling is that ICANN's new policy is the product
of incumbents that have a strong interest in preventing any new TLDs.</p>]]></description>
<dc:subject>Internet Governance</dc:subject>
<dc:creator>karl</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-10-29T15:40:12-08:00</dc:date>
</item>


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