I have had time to dig deeper into ICANN's so-called Strategic Plan. (See First thoughts on ICANN's so-called "Plan" and Vodoo Economics a la ICANN)
Like ICANN's former CRADA Report this "Strategic Plan" is buzzword-full but content-empty.
If we look into section 1 we find the following:
Section 1a.i: We see that ICANN is doing nothing more than planning to adopt better paper-pushing procedures to better serve the IETF when the IETF needs a number allocated.
Section 1a.ii: It is good that ICANN is thinking about cooperating in the construction of a DNS test bed. Some of us have been doing this kind of testing for years on our own dime and have been suggesting to ICANN that this would be a good thing to have. It is only this week that on the NANOG mailing list there has been a discussion of measurements being made privately about the question of routing jitter with regard to anycast roots. Unfortunately ICANN intends merely to "cooperate" - ICANN is not actually stating an intention to do anything more. ICANN is not committing to provide staffing, space, or funding for this. As usual, ICANN is making a promise to do nothing.
Also in Section 1a.ii we see that ICANN is planning on moving the L root server - again. The first move was described in the CRADA report nearly two years ago and, from my conversations with ICANN, was an expensive move that was fully intended to resolve all the issues that are apparently going to be re-solved. The term "Brownian motion" - motion for motion's sake - seems appropriate.
In Section 1a.iii ICANN promises to do more reporting. Given that ICANN has virtually no existing history of doing reporting - Where, for example, is the report on this summer's outage of .org? - any reporting would be an improvement over the status quo. However, the reporting that is enumerated by this section is nothing more than reports about business related activities rather than the kind of operational information that we need to evaluate how well the internet DNS and IP address systems allocation systems are running and how well ICANN is protecting us against technical instability in those systems.
In section 1a.iv ICANN promises to work harder to maintain the root zone file. That's nice. That file has a rate of change on the order of one item changed per day, and that is mainly changes in the NS records for ccTLD name servers. Verisign has been doing this job for years with only a few (and now quite ancient) problems - ICANN is making a big deal about an issue that has already been solved.
Section 1a.v contains a bold bit of claim jumping. In that section ICANN asserts that the L root server was "entrusted to ICANN". That is not true. The internet community has never "entrusted ICANN" with the operation of the L root server. The truth is that the L root server was entrusted to IANA, not to ICANN. ICANN operates the L root server only through ICANN's undertaking of the IANA function under a purchase order from the US National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration. Should ICANN relinquish or lose the IANA function (for example if the IETF transfers that function as part of the IETF's presently ongoing re-organization, then ICANN would have to say "bye bye" to the L root server.
Section 1a.v makes no service level commitments - so just like every other root server operator, ICANN (channeling for IANA) is unwilling to make any concrete service level promises to the internet community. The most that ICANN-as-IANA promises is to build what amounts to a routinely hardened facility and to chat it up with people in ICANN sponsored committees. ICANN needs to give enforceable, specific, and verifiable promises about server availability, responsively, and accuracy. In addition, ICANN/IANA needs to demonstrate a viable, and practiced, suite of disaster contingency plans and demonstrate that it has the human and fiscal resources to draw upon should the need arise.
Section 1b, beginning on page 32, is similarly full of sound and fury that, in the end, signifies nothing.
Section 1b.i is a laugh. ICANN has from the beginning promised to do these things yet it has never done so except twice. The first was with regard to internationalized domain names. The second was in response to Versign's "Sitefinder". In every other instance, ICANN has passively watched as other actors make decisions. For example, ICANN allowed the removal of IPv4 information from the root zone, an action that weakens the resilience of DNS during times of stress, without as much as a chirp of concern or even the ability to articulate reasons for its non-concern.
Section 1b.ii is simply a claim to a more expansive role for ICANN. We have plenty of groups already working on internet security. Even if ICANN could be a contender in this area it would be simply one more Johhny Come Lately. But ICANN has demonstrated an amazing incompetence in this area. For example ICANN has long known that data escrow would help DNS registrars recover from disasters. Yet ICANN has never bothered to require that registrars engage in good information protection practices. Given ICANN's general technical incapacities it would not be wise to allow ICANN to expand into yet another realm. In addition, one has to ask where is the community concensus that drove ICANN to put this idea into its "Strategic Plan"?
Section 1b.iii is a subtle misrepresentation - ICANN counts even vacuous "understandings" to be counted as firm "agreements". If one actually examines ICANN's existing or proposed "understandings" with root server operators and address registries one sees that they are documents that contain no binding obligations on either side. These understandings are more akin to papers describing a divorce than ones describing a partnership. The community of internet users is looking to ICANN for protection against network instability; yet ICANN has, through these understandings, abandoned any role of oversight.
Section 1b.iii also overstates the rate in which even these empty understandings are being entered into. One would think from the language of ICANN's plan that ccTLDs are anxiously queuing up in long lines to sign ICANN's "pay and obey" ccTLD agreements. In truth they are not - the rate of ccTLD agreements has been very slow and there is no sign that ICANN has done more than sign up the easy ccTLD pickings. Not even ICANN's home country, and the country of its founding governmental agency, has bothered to sign ICANN's ccTLD agreement.
As for the Strategic Plan's section 2 - "Competition and Choice" - all I can say is this: Why should ICANN even be engaged in what amounts to legislative activities that regulate business practices, determine property rights, impose judicial mechanisms, and select who among competitors can enter a marketplace?
There are two kinds of words - there are words that simply consume ink and occupy space. And there are words that communicate concrete ideas, intentions, and promises. With regard to ICANN's principal role as protector of internet stability ICANN has filled its so-called "Strategic Plan" with the first kind of words. There is nothing in this plan that says anything that goes beyond vague promises and platitudes. And to make it more unappetizing, the words that are used are the same tired words and empty phrases that ICANN has been pawning off ever since its inception.
There is one thing that can be said on a positive note: ICANN certainly put a lot of work into creating a pretty document.
Here are some more thoughts on ICANN's "Strategic Plan".
In that report - on page 22 - ICANN is claiming that ICANN has saved the community of internet users over a billion dollars due to reduced fees.
That is simply untrue.
ICANN has overseen a reduction in domain name fees, that is true.
But ICANN has constructed a price floor that prevents fees from being reduced even further and thus has prevented competition from delivering even more savings to the domain name consumer.
How much has this price floor cost internet users?
My estimate is that this price floor is taxing internet users to the tune of $200,000,000 to $300,000,000 (US) per year. This estimate is based on ICANN's artificial price floor that is today on the order of $6 per name per year and an estimated non-fiat registry price of about $1 per name per year.
Over ICANN's five years of existance this cumulates to more than the billion dollars that ICANN says it has saved.
In other words, even if we grant to ICANN the billion dollars it claims, there is still more than an addtional billion dollars that ICANN has dragged out of the pockets of internet users and pushed into the pockets of domain name registries.
ICANN at long last finally issued its so-called "Strategic Plan".
It's not a very good plan, at least not when viewed from the perspective of the users of the internet or from the perspective of a business that uses DNS or wants to enter the DNS business.
ICANN's plan does nothing to protect the technical stability of the net. ICANN is supposed to be our fire department to make sure that the net doesn't burn down. But ICANN seems rather more interested in trying to be the king of some other hill leaving the community of internet users unprotected and the internet vulnerable.
Below is the initial comment on this plan that I sent to ICANN's "comment" address:
To: strategic-plan-comments@icann.org
There is nothing in this plan that deals with ICANN's primary mision: the technical stability of the internet's domain name and IP addressing systems.
To be more specific, there is nothing in this plan that indicates that ICANN will have any role or duty whatsoever regarding the ability of the upper layers of the domain name system (DNS) to operate reliabily, efficiently, promptly, and accurately.
There is nothing in this plan that deals with the proper preparation of the root zone file and its dissemination to root servers.
There is nothing in this plan that deals with responsible operation of the root servers in normal times or in times of stress.
There is nothing in this plan that deals with sensible and balanced allocation of IP addresses.
Instead this plan is completely about business and economic regulation and, by implication, about the prohibition of innovation that is not in accord with ICANN's business and economic rules.
That is not only *not* a narrow mission but it is also a completely inappropriate mission for ICANN. The mission that ICANN describes for itself is that of a national legislature or heavy regulatory agency.
The community of internet users require from ICANN a guarantee that the internet's core infrastructures including the upper tiers of DNS and IP address allocation operate reliably.
The internet community does not require a body that imposes economic, business, and social policy on the internet.
Yet it is that former requirement that this plan ignores and it is that latter non-requirement that this plan proposes.
--karl--
Karl Auerbach
Santa Cruz, California, USA
Former elected ICANN Director for North America
I've read (via Thomas Roessler's wonderful "ICANN Blog Aggregator") three notes, one by Thomas Roessler, one by Ross Rader, and one by Bret Fausett.
These are three people that I respect and trust. My disagreements below, to the extent they are disagreements, are small when compared to the large number of times when I find myself in agreement with their views.
First to Thomas: You write: "
There is another challenge that ALAC has to deal with: The legacy of the at-large elections in 2000. For many people, ALAC looks like a poor replacement to having prestigious board seats and global elections. In a way, that's true. But look at the policy-making reality: Board members rarely intervene with actual policy issues...
ICANN's Board of Directors has enormous power - in fact in ICANN the board has the ultimate plenary power. ICANN's Board of Directors has time and time again wimped out and abandoned its responsibilities to "staff". This is a very sad state of affairs. And it is a state of affairs that will be remedied only when board members actually start acting like board members and asserting their authority. The At-Large of year 2000, had it been allowed to develop its election process, could have been a source for assertive directors.
The ALAC, on the other hand, was emasculated before it was birthed; it was specifically designed so that it would never have the opportunity or power to drive change within ICANN. I have stayed away from the ALAC precisely because it is in fact a poor replacement for the vibrant system that began to evolve in 2000.
Thomas, you (and others such as Vittorio B. and Wendy S.) have done a stellar job using the ALAC to address policy issues - the community of internet users should rise up and thank you.
Second to Ross: You write how ICANN's new transfers policy is an improvement. And I agree that the policy may well be an improvement. And I agree that there have been many who have been naysayers who speak more to protect their revenue streams than from a disinterested perspective.
But to my mind the real question is this: The kind of authority that can impose these policies is a legislative authority. Yes, there is the theory that ICANN merely sits atop a private pyramid of contracts and that this is merely a private, voluntary, regulatory system. However, that ignores the reality that there is no real alternative and that ICANN exercises powers that supersede choices that governments may make to the contrary. I have trouble accepting that ICANN and its policies can be truly characterized as nothing more than private, voluntary, contractual matters.
And it is certainly hard, in fact impossible, to articulate any real linkage between ICANN's DNS business policies (of which the transfer policy is but a part) and ICANN's role as the protector of the technical stability of the internet's DNS.
It seems to me that the kind of power to impose a worldwide domain name transfers policy ought to be wielded by a body that contains substantially more elements of public accountability, open processes, and transparent decision-making than does the private California corporation called ICANN.
To my way of thinking this fact of governmental powers exercised by non-governmental actors is the core issue that needs to be addressed by the UN's WGIG.
And thus to Bret: I agree with you that the issues that the WGIG has assigned to itself are too large of a bite.
My comment here is your comparison of that bite to that of ICANN. I believe that there is a job to be done with regard to DNS and IP address allocation. And ICANN was assigned to those jobs. I think we both agree that ICANN has had more than a few problems. But I don't think that the source of those problems was the job that was assigned or the size of the job but, rather, the fact that ICANN has never bothered to do those things that it was assigned to do. Instead ICANN has hopped onto an enormous invisible horse and is trying to gallop all over the world to establish itself as the arbiter of business practices in the domain name industry with a special nod to the protection of one class of rights (intellectual property) over other classes (such as personal privacy.)
The problem that has hobbled ICANN is not the size of the job, but rather ICANN's inability to focus on the job that it was created to do.
I believe that the WGIG needs to recognize early that internet governance is a big endeavor and that the path to success begins by doing small things very well. This means that the the tasks of internet governance need to be identified with surgical precision and that the body created to do each task must be driven with Procrustean force to remain within the steel rails of its task definition.
The following has to be one of the most stupid phrases ever uttered:
"legitimate methods of waging war"
War is the ultimate human failure; it is a recourse to the worst forms of coercion: mayhem, death, brutal force, and destruction. War is never "legitimate"; it is unfortunately sometimes necessary as a final recourse.
Over the years various countries have entered into agreements to limit certain kinds of behavior. That has been a good thing. However, it is well understood that those agreements can fall by the wayside when a warring party has its back to the wall and is faced with complete destruction. In addition, some countries, such as my own, have refused to join other nations in agreements that restrict land mines or establish international courts.
So who is this government that is trying to argue that some kinds of war are legitimate and some are not? You guessed it - the United States. Yes, the nation that brought us everything from Wounded Knee to Dresden to Hiroshima to Mai Lai.
And who uttered this asinine phrase? One Mark Corallo of the US Department of Justice trying to explain why the United States believes that it is right and proper to subject a prisoner to procedures that would make a Spanish Inquisitor blush with shame.
I am usually proud of my country. But not today.
Tomorrow is the big day.
Please vote.
Please vote even if it is raining or snowing.
Please vote even if you feel that your vote won't make a difference. (It will.)
Please vote even if you do not agree with my own choice.
Your right to vote is precious. It has already been taken from you on matters regarding the Internet.
Tommorow is your chance to show the world that individual choice and democracy are still alive.